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IN THE COURT OF THE STATE~OF 
E. BIRCH and FONrELLA BIRCH, 
wire, 
Plaintiff-Respondents, 
v. 
~ W. FULLER, JUDITH HYDE 
IR, KENNETH W. JUDD and 
l. F, JUDD, 
Defendant-Appellants. 
. 
. 
: 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Case No. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA! 
\{AX E. BIRCH and FONTELLA 
3IRCH, his wife, 
Plaintiff-Respondents, 
v. 
ORREST W. FULLER, JUDITH 
YDE FULLER, KENNETH W. 
UDD and RUBY F. JUDD, 
Defendant -Appellants. 
Case No. 
8822 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now the defendant-appellants and respectfully petitior 
Court for a rehearing of the above entitled matter and for 
onsideration of the matters set forth in the opinion of The 
lrtfiledApril Zl, 1959. 
Dated this 24th day of May. 
nts 
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BRIEF UF APPELLAN '5 
It s not t e des1re of petit1oner s ~o unduly belabor DO n s 
l h b llt a"' has oeen .sa1d !yai 1g only s 1~ t eco·1omLc cons""quence "' , 
·son: '' Every m: n c ( h a s) i ~a rho ice bet we e t r u h and r t p•) 
m can never hav,. both Petitioners feel that •here ~re th:ree 
within •he op1nion of The C.ourt which are not consistent 
with th .. aw or with the record in this case upo1 whicn they 
like the opport' ruty to express themselves furci:u:=r. 
s·rATEMi..NT OF POINTS 
r I. THE ~ARLI~R OPI NlON OF THIS COURT FILED DECE 
!., 958, INADVERTANTLY EXTRACTED FROM THE BRIE~ 
:SPONDENTS .f'AC TS WHICH ADMITEDL Y WERE NOT IN Tf-
RD. '"~'HESE FAC' S WERE OF SCANDALOUS NATURE AND 
:QURT SHOULD CORRECT THE DAMAGE DONE BY ITS 
:ER OPINION 
II. THE COUR1' E.RRED IN UPHOLDING THE FINDING OF' 
OURT BE; ..... f)W THAT THE APPELLANTS HAD NO CONTRA 
R-ESPONDENTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT FCR 
'ER OF TITLE 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT 
~COURT BELOW FOl{ TRESPASS BY CONSTRUCTIVE 
)SION. 
ARGUMENT 
OINT l. THE EARLIER OPINION OF THIS COURT FILED 
.., 
.. 
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~MHER 12, JCJ58; INADV:"-:R. ENTl Y F..t~I'RACIED FROM TH 
F OF RESPONDENTS FACTS WHlCI ADMlTEDI Y WERE NO 
1E RECORD THESE FACTS WERE O:E SCANDALOr S 
)RE AND THE COURT' SHOULD CORRECT THE DAMAG!; 
~BY I IS EARLIER OPINION 
Since the same erroneous •a,.ts do not appear aga1n 1n 'he 
rtcent opimon of The Court, it may be assumed that the 
concedes the error of tne1r 1..' .... lusion with.n Its first opin·.on, 
ving thus co~'"'eded the error, should grant defendants still 
g motwn to strikf'" these facts from the br1ef of respor dents 
)uld further, strike them from the minds of those tu whou1 
~mal cpinion was distributed by some modest corrective 
nt in fhe1r final opinion. Defendants do not demand the 
of COU"Se, '.or plaintiffs, although there ~ COUSlderable 
for such demand, but me rf:l v request tha the damagp done 
e. 
POiNT ll 
IE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THr~ h'IND[NG OF TH.t.: 
BELOW THAT TlfE APPELLANTS HAD NO CONT KLl l' 
:SPONDENTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE .. J UIX.xMEN !. r'UR 
R OF TiTLE. 
~eply to the argurnent of defendants tl,at the t:v1denc,. du~ :'j 
::: bau fa.itn or rnahce the Court in its up1n1on stau~:s. 't 
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lifficult to discern what other motive defendants had in filing 
lis pendens, particularly in view of the transmission by one 
he defendants of a rather insulting letter to the plaintiffs sor::,1E 
months earlier." This language it is feared apparently sub· 
1tes the test of anger and insult for theelement of malice whic~ 
b~en oft defined by this Court as "the want of probable cause'' 
:f of Appellants, pages 3 and 4, and op. eite.) While the angt 
ltingly expressed by one of the defendants in his letter, Ex-
11F", might demand an apology it is certainly not sufficiently 
1g to demand that the heretofore existing legal definition of 
ce in slander of title actions be changed by judicial decision. 
e instant case, under the definition of malice obtaining at the 
the defendants could not be liable if they had probable 
~to believe they had a bona fide claim and were as se rtir.~.g the 
in good faith. This test must be applied as at the time the 
ding was done for even though they later abandoned their 
' and failed to file their complaint no damage was done. In 
states no damage could be assessed even if no contract 
d and even if the slanderer lacked probable cause for the 
:ling, for the plaintiffs made no effort to sell the property 
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n5cnpt ?.:1rch REC 81) and h"'nce lost noth1ng by the record-, 
f the lis pendens B '...l L n U t a h attorney s fee s rna )' be g r a r t {' d 
1. is necessary to determine whethe tl e defendants t1.ac prob-
:ause for fil• ng the , 5 penaens. 
The CL.urt .n ts opinio · fi ds cornpeten,. evidence ;n the 
d that S2:.the was not to oe bourtd by ue se ... e s o ( transact 1 on:: 
natter is no particularly germane tor Lhe ause against 
was dismissed upon the motion of plain'tlff lRecord, pag~ 
towever the Court hag treated the znatter and defenda 1ts 
likewuse The competent e'!ldence referred to must appear 
cxh ,ltl5 er ·n the lestimony of Judd for th1s n-::a~.ter Ls no .. 
elsewbe re Judd ind1 ates hat he knew Sathe.,. was ~.ry."lg 
B i r c he ... pi a c e l r o rr tax s ale , w a s a 1 "~"1 e n d o ,. h 1 s (.~ u d d ' s ) 
~he ( udd) asked Sather to t-ee 1f he uuld get a lod 
npt J uc a D f l Th a restimuu even taLer out of con 
P· 
e infe renee thd.t t 1c-: lud.ll 
only cons1deradon or rha t>ather ;;(a::.; not o be bound by 
ements referred to Inde"'d, the safety o Sather rtur. 
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,tiffs demands a contrary result as does the fai~ significance 
e ~stimony for if Sather was not bounQ by Exhibi~ A , •nen h 
fair inference remaining is that Birch and Sather defr~'ud~d 
~ity Loan and Finance for their joint mortgage to this co::Y 
Exhibit ''C", mortgages the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
in Exhibit "A", at page 2, paragraph 2, of such mortgage 
! is considerable doubt that this was their intent If Sai:he r 
ot bound by Exhibit "A" per se he must have ratified i .. whe-n 
iligned it, Exhibit''!", or when he revised it, Exhibit ''E''. 
Def1!ndants urge that any man armed with Exhibits "A ' and 
>uld have probable cause to file a lis pendens or other pro-
e affidavit after learning of Exhlbi.t "5 ", the relea~e and 
1ation of the contract found in Exhibit 11 A'' That these 
ants did honestly believe they had a contract is bel .. .:viflcec 
fact that they, Judd at least, entered upon the prope .tty nd 
onsiderabl~ improveznents without objection oy Birch It 
~ther doubt exists that they honestly feH they had a cla rn 
serted the same in good faith it may be forever disposed of 
renee to Exhibit "F", where, no matter how insultin~ly, 
asserts the claim, demands that the title be cleared. note~ 
t.. 
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fpayment has been made, and requests that the same be 
ltd upon the contract balance. Significant in this respect 
.'1 the fact that the notice served, Exhibit "G", names Sather 
:o-de!endant with Birch. No more than this honest assertion 
apparently bona fide claim is needed even though the clain1 
,d or later nullified. See Brief of Appellants pages 3 and <t, 
) cite. 
However, since the court below ruled that no contract ezistec 
il Court affirms such finding, and, further since if a con-
Ud exist the position of defendants can only be strengthened, 
Ltter is treated here, briefly. The exhibits introduced on 
·ace create such a contra~.'t. No other possibility exists. 
exhibits and the matter therein contained is absolutely bind-· 
)Q plaintiffs (and bene e the coui"t) for they are th f" i r own 
::e and they cannot be impeached or n1odified by parole. 
ode Annotated, 1953, 78-2")-13, 78-lS-ll, and 78 2.5-lo. 
f the witnesses cornment upon the!:;e exh1b1ts and the cvnt r<tc 
'contain except Judd. While his testimony is at best l on-
lt does identify Exhibit "I'' and recalls that 1t was exel'utt-d 
tlace. Tran&cript, Judd-D-63 and 67. The tf" stlOHJny of 
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6- th b · s t~or the trial court's finding for the court w1s n:·h e as1 
"It is quite evident to me that he (Judd) doesn't know. 
He thinks there was a contract between the parties entered 
into here but he doesn't know which one it was. He prob-
ably n:ever saw it. .. He said he didn lt know anythiag about 
that (Exhibit "A"). It is quite apparent he doesn't. .. I 
don 1t think he knows anything about it personally ... SonH!: 
body told him he could go in there is probably what hap-· 
pened." Transcript, Judd-D-67, 68 and 69. 
uite obvious» in view of such comment, that the court below 
not and did not base its finding that no contra.ct ex.isted upon 
1timony of Judd, and no other basis for such flnding exists. 
:ourt, in its opinion, comments that no one objected to this 
:of the court below. Such is not the case for having based 
nti:re defena~ to the slander of title action upon Exhibit ·'J' 1 , 
lnts object,:d as best they could. They appealed. Arld 
h they did not rDake such finding the subject of a SC!!p~.race 
1 their b.rit:f they vf:.ry carefully pointed out the record co'1 
'thing justifying such or any similar hnding. Brief of 
nts, page 4 T~ls is !luffic::i.ent. 
erhaps, the confusion generated and the finding was based 
hibits "B" and "E... If so, this can be cleared up by onlv 
•mment. Th!f: release and termination of Uniform Real 
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Contract, Exhibit "B", ex parte as it were, without the 
ce and/or consent of Judd and Fuller could not bind them no~. 
tJanner lessen their equity for both Sather and Judd signed 
"1'' and had actual knowledge of the assignment of Exhl"">it 
!rein contained. Neither could the revision and attempted 
sion to an option contained in Exhibit "E'' for the same reason 1 
I 
1ding was therefore completely reasonable when applied to 
but completely unfounded when extended to include Judd 
ler. 
1 short, Judd and Fuller, had probable cause to believe 
i a contract. armed as they were with Exhibits ''Att and 
1d to state the m&tter even more strongly, they in fact 
~a contract and the plaintiffs proved this beyond any 
This, then. W48 their 11 other"motive for filing the lls 
POINT Ill 
iE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF 
U.R.T BELOW FOR TRESPASS BY CONSTRUCTIVE 
SION, 
Lt Court, in discus8ing thitt matter, says; ' 1We do not be_ 
endants contention that it was error to give judgment .i..ur 
a 
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~ass is 5U!:Itainable. Defendants Sdid they had never bt>tn on 1 
1ropert'y, but the an.,wer admits that they were in pos:H.'So;Jon 
Lll n t • o an a g r t> em e u t 1 n ad e h y p 1 a 1 n t i ff to s P 11 t o r1 e f e n d il n t s . · ' I 
lanrimark in the iaw of trehpass tnerits ronJmcnl, for if 
(One concedf's the ~-!legation __ in deft:"ndants answf· r this will 
the first df>parture in the case law treating trespass quarf= 
um fregit where one in po~s..-sston has comn1itted d wrong to 
1. 
\OBSession. H~retotore the gist of a tre-spass to realty ltes 
disturbance of another's possession. Brief oi Appellants, 
on for Rehearing,. page 6. While this possession wa> only \l 
:onstrurtive posst>ssion a::, follows t1tle in the l-a~e of 
at W .. Fullt·r, Judith Hyde Fuller, anrl Ruby F. Judd, it was,.'' 
poS&f'SSlon 1n the ca., c of 1\.P nneth W Judd. T h1 s po sst> s sior:-
defendants i~ th;• m,,~t cornpr-1ling ~1ngle ~rgurn~nl for r~-
R the rourt helow, biJt other~ are legt-'r1d. 
rhe plaintiff.!:. did not "iUStt-lln !he burdt-n of JH'OCJf ll~l e~i..,i-trv 
.lish that the defendants or any of tht m wen t l'~-'Spns~e rs. 
l"ne, is fatal 
\nr court found that the defendant F. A. Hate h wali not 
~trespass and if this be the case r1eithf'1· are his ( o. 
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lants. While it would lie ill in the mouths of defendants to 
) 
~in that their co-defendant was awarded the ren1edy and 
that thty demanded, it mu.st be noted that the evidence 
tHatch j~ strongPr than it is against any of the- other de-
:1. He was actually upon the premises many times. Tran-
Birch-D-7, 8, 14, ll, and 2.), etc. Shortly after July 4, 
he following converscttion took place upon the premises in 
sence of Mrs. Birch, Transcript, Birch-D-15,: Question: 
I that conversdtion ... ? ", Answer: ''I told him (Hatch) 
{didn't have any right on the place, that they had failed 
i&e the option, and that he was a willful trespaSit:r and 
'We are going to keep this hay deal.' 1 said, 'You know 
l wlllfull trespasser' and he said, 'I admit it but I am 
Ill In ~pite ot this the Court found no rnoncy judgn1t:"nt 
:ate h. These defendants urge, that if L·redible j11Stlficu-
ed for this result, that :sarrte reason, t-xcu!-Je, or wh""t 
tnd!:. to all other defendants to a n1uch r.treatttr dl .. :~ree 
ofthem were never on thf' property at all. This should 
tnt. 
l 1 
I 
'I 
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The defendants are not hable for trespass for the plaintiff~ ' 
them into possession. Transcript, Birch-D--7, 8, ard 9, .;; ·c 
made no objection to the entry of Hatch, Judd, one Snu h, th~ 
1y employees and several Indians. Although Birch is quL.k to 
1t out that he diu !iO because of the May 4(? ), opt1on with Sa.thl 
ibit E a td those who cL.d go on the property went on pur sua 
xhibit 11' It nattei s little that each bad his own reason for 
on, they were on for all purposes, and ~r poseh:~·;sion. Once 
1ct peacable pos•ession they co·.la not tres~.Jass ~gainst their 
possession (cons~ructive and/or a~ tual) and the pLalntlffs. 
der to terminate possession and make continued }OsBesslon 
wful must rd y upon the statutory r.::mec y of un...awful ae iiune r 1 
serve their notice to quit a1nce ~he contract forfe1ture prov1s 
Uniform Real E3tate Contract and/or t'1e term .. natlon of the 
n ('?~ a.re nc .. self operative. (;a.rstense•.l v. han£eu 107 U 
152 P Zd 954 Leo_ne ~- ---~-~nig~_!_ 84 U 417, ~4 .P z i b J9 
L . .R I Z 3 Z. ~-~--~~ rt ~.:_ -~~~e, 2 56 P. /: d 2 41, and K • ~t2~~ 
11 3 u (ld) 419, 285 r. 2d 1114, 1118. While defendant I 
have be«n liable under such a cause of action for S\ h 
ges a.s occurred, they are not liable foi.· tr e~pa5s tur r-heir 
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ilt&sion was never tern1inated or n1ade unlawful as by law pre 
ad. 
The defendants Ruby F Judd, Forrest W. Fuller and Judit 
e Fuller cannot be liable for the wrongful acts of Judd and 
:h, if any, for, ''Where several persons are engaged together 
common purpose (and even this was not proven here) and a 
pan is comn11tted by one or more of them, a'>sent thereto 
te others is presumed only if the cornnt~n design 15 unlawful. 
·e the object to be accomplished is a lawful one, assent is a 
~r of fact to be proved. 52 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 889 
pass sections 75, 76 and 77. Italics and parenthetical comrnf 
~writer. Defendant Forrest Fuller was at best a t("'nant in 
lon and certainly tenancy in comrnon and the entirely agrana· 
its conducted by the defendants Judd and Hatch are not pc r se 
~ul, and no other common dt:::;i15n or purpCJJe and/or assent 
~oved. In fact quite the contrary was evinced, Certaini 
Judd, and J u d it h Hyde Full e r, who we r e not pa r t i (" s t u 
the contracts and were never on the pren1ises were not 
Uers. 
:ven if the defendants were trespassers, and such i6, not 
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ase, no damages could be assessed, for no attempt was made 
e plaintiffs to apportion or set forth with any certainty just 
1 acts were done by Judd and which acts were done by Hatch, 
hich acts were done by their servants and employees, and 
empt was made to establish which acts were done prior to 
, 1957, and which acts were done after July 4. "While the 
iff need not prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, evi-
affording only a basis for mere speculation and conjecture 
he cause of pl ai nti ff' injuries is wholly insufficient a.s a 
c1pon which to rest a verdict for damages.". and, " •.. when 
more tort-feasors acting independently of each other inflict 
.. one cannot be held liable for the trespasses of the other .. 
tERlCAN JURISPRUDENCE, Trespass, 861, 892, sections 
80. 
>ne remaining area of confusion exist .s. The Court t n 1 t s 
states: 1 'The trial court indicated that only testirnony re-
0 damages suffered because of the trespass need be adduGed 
ven if this were the case it should be reversed for there 
some showing other than that the damages occurred for 
:ndants must have entered, and such entry rnufl;t Lave been 
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!blful fo.r if i 1 not proven or d no rna tte r how 
ve the damage a, the s are not liable for then1. Defen 
;a never stipulated that they were trespassers, or t'hat they 
any damage and the record bears this out. Plaintiffs never 
'ld such to be the case and the record bears this out. Even so 
rial court never (in context) indicated that the only te 
heard was that relating to damages Transcript Birch D-4. 
COURT: "I thought we were 
tot into a lot of these prel 
into the question of 
matters." 
MR. MAXFIELD: ''If it could be and have the 
"ony as to them we would be willing to do that. 11 
THE COURT: "And that it was wrongful '' 
MR. HYDE: "No, we won 1 t s that it was ,, 
and The frana~ of mind of the cou.t·t was that the 
''' muat be proven and that they (plaintiff} must establish 
t acta were Again at page 54 of the transc 
1 
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fcb.C-54, word• of similar protent are repeatflld: 
THE COURT: Just a moment, we are going far afield, Mr. 
4le. I thought we wanted to confine this to the matter of tres-
lJ andcamages and I think we ought to do that. 
MR. HYDE: lsn 1t it relevant whether or not they are operat 
iunder some agreement when they were on the property? 
THE COUR'l': "He stated they were. There ia no question 
~t that -• during May, at least, until the latter part of June, 
trding to his testimony. 11 
It is obvious that on the one hand defendants claimed under 
Contracts and on the other that plaintiffs claimed they were notl 
lttg and that for this reason the court attempted to limit the 
""of the trial by excluding testimony other than as to damages 
ll to the wrongful chara<.~ter of the acts creating them. Trans 
pages 107 ... 110, inclusive. The only reason he was not 
ilttely succt;ssful is that the plaintiff~ in&ist~d on going into 
tltters sought to be precluded, at great l~ngth and the Judge 
:r let them do so. They introdu,·ed a$ their own, Exhibits 
lrouah ~'1" and the court let them in. Once in evidence they 
l't>tt all1R~r,pose• and their content and purport binds th~ 
:TW' 
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.1ntiffs conclusively. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant -appellants concede that The Supreme Court 
y, where the circun1stances compel such a result, over-rule 
;ting case law, and change it accordingly. However, if such 
one, the facts which compel such action and the defects in the 
ting law should be pointed out in the opinion in order that de-
~d counsel when they find themselves on the other side of the 
tion, and others concerned with the law, may cite the decision 
rately or distinguish it as the case may be. 
In the instant case defendant-appellants respectfully urge the: 
1ch compelling reason in the fact situation pr.esented or defect 
e t>xisting law exists. Plaintiff-respondents fell woefully 
:of sustaining the burden of proof that the defendant·-· 
lants trespassed, in fact they proved that some of them we1·e 
·on the property and that all others E-"ntered and remained 
heir owr: consent and without objection on their part. Plain-
~spondents proved beyond the shadow of any doubt that the 
iant-appellants had a contractual agreernent to purchase 
operty of plaintiff-respondents and that they relied upon 
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11d asserted such claim honestly and openly. The lower court 
10uld be reversed in both matters and the action dismissed. 
It should not lessen the strength of the argument of all 
.fendanta to point out that the wives, Ruby F. Judd, and Judith 
rde Fuller, were not parties to any of the contracts, nor did 
ey enter upon the premises. Their only wrong was to be 
med as plaintiffs in the abortive notice to quit or pay rent, 
hibit "G", and to be named as defendants in the complaint of 
.intiffs. No greater wrong can, or has been attributed to 
"· CertainJy in their case the court below should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FORREST W. FULLER 
Attorney for 4ppellants 
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